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We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that
taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies.
We show that, as long as the discount factor of the politician is equal to or greater than that of the citizens,
the Chamley-Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than
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Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) summarize the main result of the Ramsey paradigm
of dynamic optimal taxation–taxing capital income is a bad idea. When taxes on labor
and capital are restricted to be linear and when the government is benevolent and can
commit to a complete sequence of tax policies, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) result
holds–the optimal dynamic tax sequence involves zero capital taxes in the long run. The
result is surprisingly general and robust in a variety of settings, including models with
human capital accumulation (Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi, 1997), models where capital-
holders are distinct from workers (Judd, 1985), and certain overlapping generations models
(Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe, 1999, Garriga, 2001, and Erosa and Gervais, 2002). Similar
r e s u l t sh o l di ns t o c h a s t i cv e r s i o n so ft h en e o c lassical growth model (e.g., Zhu, 1992, Chari,
Christiano, and Kehoe, 1994) and most quantitative investigations suggest that capital
taxes should be zero or very small even in the short run (e.g., Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe,
1999).1 These prescriptions of the Ramsey taxation are used to guide policy not only in
developed countries but also around the world.
An obvious shortcoming of this paradigm, and of the results that it implies, is that,
in practice, taxes are not set by benevolent governments, but by politicians who have
objectives diﬀerent from citizens. Moreover, these politicians are typically unable to
commit to complete sequences of future taxes. These two frictions, self-interest and lack
of commitment, are at the center of many political economy models (see, e.g., Persson
and Tabellini, 2004, Besley and Coate, 1998) and are also the cornerstone of the public
choice theory (see, e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). From a practical viewpoint, it then
seems natural to expect that these frictions should also aﬀect equilibrium taxes and what
types of tax structures are feasible. A major question for the analysis of dynamic ﬁscal
policy is whether the key conclusions of the Ramsey paradigm generalize to more realistic
environments with self-interested politicians and no commitment. This paper presents a
simple answer to this question.
The answer has two parts. First, our analysis reveals a simple but intuitive economic
mechanism that makes positive capital taxes optimal from the viewpoint of the citizens;
positive capital taxes reduce capital accumulation and thus the incentives of politicians
1A notable exception is the New Dynamic Public Finance literature, which studies dynamic nonlinear
taxes and characterizes conditions under which capital taxes need to be positive to provide intertemporal
incentives to individuals with private information (see, e.g., Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski 2003,
Kocherlakota, 2005, Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning, 2006).
1to deviate from the policies favored by the citizens. Thus, starting from an undistorted
allocation a small increase in capital taxes is typically beneﬁcial because it relaxes the
political economy constraints. Second, despite this ﬁrst-order eﬀect, we show that the
result that capital taxes should be equal to zero in the long run generalizes to some political
economy environments. That is, even when taxes are set by self-interested politicians
with no commitment power to future tax sequences, the best sustainable equilibrium may
involve zero taxes. In particular, we delineate precise conditions under which capital
taxes are positive in the (best) subgame perfect equilibrium of the political economy
environment we specify, but then limit to zero in the long run. Conversely, when these
conditions are not satisﬁed, capital taxes are positive and in the long run, thus presenting
a possible explanation for the ubiquity of capital taxes in practice.
More speciﬁcally, we model the political economy of taxation using a version of the
political agency models by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). In this model, taxes are the
outcome of a dynamic game between politicians and citizens. While politicians have the
power to set taxes, they are potentially controlled by the citizens, who can remove them
from power using elections or other means. We analyze a neoclassical growth model, where
self-interested politicians decide on linear taxes on labor and capital income and manage
government debt. The amount that is left after servicing debt and ﬁnancing public goods
constitutes the rents for the politician in power. The interactions between citizens and
politicians deﬁne a dynamic game. We characterize the best subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) of this game from the viewpoint of the citizens.2 We show that this problem is
similar to the dynamic taxation problems in the literature except for the addition of a
sequence of sustainability constraints for politicians, which ensure that politicians are
willing to choose a particular sequence of capital and labor income taxes.
Our ﬁrst result is that despite the self-interested objectives (rent-seeking behavior) of
politicians and the lack of commitment to future policies, the best equilibrium will involve
zero capital taxes as in the celebrated Chamley-Judd result, provided that politicians have
a discount factor equal to or greater than that of the citizens. The intuition for this result
is that the society can structure dynamic incentives to politicians in such a way that, in
the long-run, rents to the politicians can be provided in a non-distortionary way. This
2Our focus on the best SPE is motivated by our attempt understand what the best feasible tax
structures will be in the presence of political economy and no commitment constraints. Naturally, the
dynamic game we specify has other equilibria, and many of these exhibit greater ineﬃciencies than the
best SPE characterized here. We believe that focusing on the best SPE highlights the dynamic economic
forces aﬀecting capital taxes in the clearest possible way.
2result shows that the Chamley-Judd conclusion concerning the desirability of zero capital
taxes in the long run has wider applicability than previously considered.
Our second result, however, delineates a speciﬁc reason for why positive capital taxes
might be desirable. If politicians are more impatient than the citizens (which may be a
better approximation to reality than the politicians having the same patience as the citi-
zens, for example, because of exogenous turnover), the best equilibrium involves long-run
capital taxes as well as additional distortions on labor supply. The reason for the presence
of positive long-run capital taxation in this case is that, when politicians have a lower
discount factor than the citizens, the political sustainability constraint remains binding
even asymptotically. This increases the marginal cost of saving (and also of supplying
labor for the citizens) because any increase in output must now also be accompanied with
greater payments to politicians to provide them with the appropriate incentives. Intu-
itively, starting from a situation with no distortions (and zero capital taxes), an increase
in capital taxation has a second-order eﬀect on the welfare of the citizens holding politi-
cian rents constant, but reduces the capital stock of the economy and thus the rents that
should be provided to politicians by a ﬁrst-order amount. Consequently, positive capital
t a x e sw i l lb eb e n e ﬁcial to citizens when political sustainability constraints are binding. It
is also important to emphasize that such an allocation indeed requires distortionary taxes.
If capital taxes were equal to zero, each individual would have an incentive to save more
and the capital stock would be too high relative to the one that maximizes the utility of
the citizens. Therefore, the “second-best allocation” can be decentralized only by using
distortionary (linear) taxes.
Overall, our results suggest that the conclusions of the existing literature may have
wider applicability than the framework with benevolent government typically considered
in the literature. But, they also highlight a new reason for why positive capital taxes might
be useful, and thus suggest caution in applying these results in practice, especially when
politicians are short-sighted either because electoral controls are imperfect or because of
exogenous turnover or other reasons.
Important precursors to our paper include Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and Wilson
(1989), who argue for distortionary taxes to be used to curb the negative political economy
eﬀects. In a more recent contribution, Becker and Mulligan (2003) argue that ineﬃcient
taxes may be beneﬁcial as a way of reducing excessive spending by politicians and provide
empirical evidence consistent with this view. Besley and Smart (2007) emphasize the
importance of ﬁscal restraints in political agency models where politicians are controlled
3by elections. None of these papers consider the implications of political economy concerns
for long-run capital taxation.3
Our analysis builds on earlier work by Chari and Kehoe (1990, 1993), who study
dynamic ﬁscal policy as a game between a benevolent (potentially time-inconsistent) gov-
ernment and citizens, and on Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a,b). Acemoglu,
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a) develop a benchmark framework for the analysis of gov-
ernment policy in the context of a dynamic game between a self-interested government
and citizens, but focus on situations in which there are either no restrictions on tax poli-
cies. Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008b) use this framework for the analysis of the
political economy of taxation and dynamic Mirrlees economies. Thus the restrictions on
taxes in that paper are endogenous and result from incentive compatibility constraints
due to incomplete information. Consequently, these papers do not directly make contact
with the large body of work on dynamic ﬁscal policy, which focuses on the canonical
Ramsey setup, where government is limited to linear (distortionary) taxes. The setup is
the basis of the celebrated Chamley-Judd zero long-run capital tax result. The current
paper extends this framework and provides a systematic analysis of how political econ-
omy constraints aﬀect the optimality of long-run capital taxes in the canonical Ramsey
setup. It thus clariﬁes the conditions under which the Chamley-Judd result extends in
the presence of political economy constraints, and also highlights why this result may not
hold because of clinical economy.
Most closely related to our paper is the recent work by Yared (2008), who studies
dynamic ﬁscal policy in a stochastic general equilibrium framework with linear taxes
under political economy constraints similar to ours. The main diﬀerence is that Yared’s
analysis does not incorporate capital, which is the focus of the present paper.
Our paper is also related to Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) and to recent work by Reis
(2007) on optimal policy with benevolent government without commitment.4 Albanesi
and Armenter (2007a,b) provides a uniﬁed framework for the study of intertemporal
distortions, though they do not incorporate explicit political economy considerations.
3We should also note that the optimality of positive capital taxes even in the long run is not an artifact
of our model and reﬂects concerns faced by real world economic policy. In a politicial economy setup
similar to ours, Caballero and Yared (2008) provide a model and evidence on how rent-seeking politicians
can aﬀect the composition of debt over the cycle and suggest that distortionary taxation may be useful
as a corrective device in such situations.
4There is also a large quantitative literature on time-inconsistent tax policies with benevolent politi-
cians (social planners). For example, Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2007) focus on time consistent
Markovian equilibria, while Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) study more general sustainable equilibria in
such environments.
4Conesa, et. al. (2008) is a numerical study of nonlinear taxation in which the capital tax
is positive. Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2008) features both positive long-
run taxation, and possibly non-converging cycles in an environment where depreciation
rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Other recent work by Aguiar,
Amador, and Gopinath (2007a,b) studies the optimal taxation of capital and optimal
debt policy in a small open economy without commitment to future policies, but once
again without political economy considerations. Finally, Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2005), Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2009) and Battaglini and Coate
(2008) also study the political economy of dynamic taxation, but focus on Markov Perfect
Equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our model
and the characterization of equilibrium. It presents all of our main theoretical results.
Section 3 illustrates these theoretical results using a simple quantitative exercise. Section
4c o n c l u d e s .
2 Model and Main Result
We start by setting up a neoclassical economy with Ramsey taxation closely following the
standard treatment in Chari and Kehoe (1998). We then augment it with the political
economy setup of electoral accountability models in which the politician cannot commit
and is self interested.
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon discrete-time economy populated by a continuum of mea-




 [() − ()] (1)
where  ≥ 0 denotes consumption,  ≥ 0 is labor supply, and  ∈ (01) is the discount
factor of the citizens. Preferences are assumed to be separable for simplicity. We make
the standard assumptions on preferences that  : R+ → R+ and  : R+ → R+ are twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, with derivatives 0 (·) and 0 (·), are strictly increasing; (·) is
strictly concave and (·) is strictly convex. In addition, we impose the following standard
Inada conditions on preferences:
1. lim→0 0 ()=0 . Moreover, there exists some ¯  ∈ (0∞) such that lim→¯ 0 ()=
∞. This feature implies that the marginal disutility of labor becomes arbitrarily
large when individuals supply the maximum amount of labor, ¯ .
52. lim→0 0 ()=∞ and lim→∞ 0 ()=0 .
These assumptions ensure interior solutions for  and .
We use subscript  to denote an individual citizen and designate the set of citizens by
. Each citizen starts with an identical initial endowment of capital 0 = 0 at time  =0 .
At time , an amount of public goods  needs to be ﬁnanced, otherwise, production in the
economy is equal to zero. For example, one can think of the public goods  as expenditure
on infrastructure. When the necessary amount of public goods is provided, the unique
ﬁnal good of the economy can be produced via the aggregate production function (),
where  ≥ 0 denotes the aggregate capital stock, and  ≥ 0 denotes the aggregate labor
provided by all the citizens. We assume that  is strictly increasing and concave in both
of its arguments, continuously diﬀerentiable (with derivatives denoted by  (··) and
 (··)) and exhibits constant returns to scale. Throughout, to simplify notation, we
interpret  (··) as the production function inclusive of undepreciated capital. Finally,
we also assume that the aggregate production function satisﬁes the following natural
requirements
a. there exists ¯ ∞ such that ( ¯  ¯ )  ¯ . This assumption ensures that the
steady-state level of output has to be ﬁnite (since by the concavity of ,i ta l s o
implies that ( ¯ ) for all  ≥ ¯ );
b.  (0) = 0 for all . This assumption implies that when there is no employment,
the marginal product of capital is equal to 0.
Factor markets are competitive, and thus, as long as the necessary amount of public
good is provided, the wage rate and the interest rate (which is also the rental rate of
capital) at time ,  and ,s a t i s f y
 = ( ) and  =  ( ) (2)
The only tax instruments available to the government are linear taxes on capital, ,
and labor income, . The government can also use one-period non-state contingent
bonds for debt management (see below). Taxation and debt management decisions at
time  are made by the politician in power. There is a set I of potential politicians with
identical preferences deﬁned on their own consumption,  ≥ 0. In particular, the utility





6where (·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously diﬀerentiable, with
(0) = 0. Note that the discount factor of politicians,  ∈ (01), is potentially diﬀerent
from that of the citizens, .
Denote by  ∈ {01} whether the government will supply the necessary public goods.
Restricting this choice of  to {01} is without loss of any generality, since anything less
than the full amount of necessary public good provision leads to the same outcome (lack
of production). Let  ∈ R b et h ed e b tl e v e lo ft h eg o v e r n m e n ta tt i m e (at date  prices),
+1 ≥ 0 denote the price of date +1government bonds at time ,a n d ∈ {01} denote
the debt default decision of the government, with  =0corresponding to default at time
 (which is feasible only when   0, that is, when the government is indebted at time
). Since the population is normalized to 1, all quantities here stand both for aggregates
and per capita levels.
The consumption of the politician, , net debt payments, and government expendi-
tures must be ﬁnanced by taxation and new debt issuance, so the government budget
constraint must be satisﬁed at all :
 +  +  ≤  +  + +1+1 (4)
The left-hand side of (4) corresponds to the outlays of the government at time ,w h i l et h e
right-hand side denotes the revenues resulting from taxation of capital and labor income
and issuance of new debt.
We introduce the default decision to ensure that (4) does not become infeasible along
oﬀ equilibrium paths. Notice also that government debt  is not speciﬁc to a politician.
If the politician in power does not default on government debt at time , but is replaced,
the next politician will start period +1with debt obligations +1. Throughout, we also
take the sequence of necessary public good expenditures {}
∞
=0 as given and assume that
this sequence is such that it is feasible to have  =1for all  (this assumption will be
stated as a part of the relevant propositions below). Otherwise, the economy would shut
down at some point and would produce zero output thereafter.
At any point of time one politician is in power. Citizens decide whether to keep the
politician in power or replace him with a new one using elections.5 Speciﬁcally, the timing
o fm o v e si ne a c hp e r i o di sa sf o l l o w s .
5Since all citizens have the same preferences regarding politician behavior, we assume that they will all
vote unanimously on replacement decisions. See Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a) and Persson
and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 4) for further discussion of various decision-making processes that citizens
can use for replacing politicians.
71. At the beginning of period  each citizen  ∈  chooses labor supply  ≥ 0 and





∈ ,w h e r e ≥ 0 denotes the capital holding of agent  ∈  at time .
Citizen  receives factor payments  and ,w i t h and  as given in (2).
2. The politician in power chooses linear taxes on capital  and labor ; 0 ≤
 ≤ 1, and makes the decisions on public good provision,  ∈ {01},a n d
default,  ∈ {01}. In addition, he announces a price +1 ≥ 0 for the next period’s
government bonds at which an unlimited amount of bonds can be purchased or sold
by the citizens. Given these choices, the politician’s consumption level  ≥ 0 is
determined from the government budget constraint (4) (if this constraint has no
solution with  ≥ 0 and  =1 , then necessarily  =0 ).
3. Given the politician’s actions {    +1},6 each citizen  ∈  chooses
consumption,  ≥ 0, and capital and government bond holdings for the next
period, +1 ≥ 0 and +1, subject to the individual ﬂow budget constraint
 + +1 + +1+1 ≤ (1 − ) +( 1− ) +  (5)
The right-hand side of this equation includes the individual’s total income, com-
prising labor and capital income net of taxes and government bond payments. The
left-hand side is the total expenditure of the individual at date .W ea l s oi m p o s e
the standard no Ponzi condition on individuals–requiring their lifetime budget con-
straints to be satisﬁed–for the equilibrium sequence of policies. Note, however, that
if   0, the lifetime budget constraint of individuals might be violated for some
non-equilibrium future policy sequences (despite the no Ponzi game condition). This
can only be an issue when there is a deviation from equilibrium policies, but we still
need to specify how the game proceeds if there is such a deviation. We assume
that at any date , each individual must pay the minimum of  or the net present
value of his income in the continuation game. This assumption ensures that lifetime
budget constraints are never violated.
4. Citizens decide whether to keep the current politician in power or replace him,
 ∈ {01},w i t h =1denoting replacement.
6Throughout, we refer to the tuple {    +1} as policies or politician’s actions. The
sequence {}
∞
=0 is taken as given and we do not explicitly mention it as part of the policies.
8T h eh i s t o r ya te v e r yn o d eo ft h eg a m e ,, encodes all actions up to that point.
Throughout, we look at pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). A strategy proﬁle
will constitute a SPE if each individual (citizen and politician) plays a best response to all
other strategies at each history .7 In addition, we will focus on the SPE that maximizes
citizens’ utility at time  =0and refer to this as the best SPE.T h ef o c u so ns y m m e t r i c
equilibria is to reduce notation (given the concavity of the utility function in (1), it is clear
that the best equilibrium will be symmetric). The focus on the best equilibrium from the
viewpoint of the citizens is motivated by our desire to understand the structure of the best
sustainable allocations in an environment with self-interested politicians, i.e., to answer
the question of what the best allocations are if the political constraints are imposed. The
focus on the best SPE also makes our analysis comparable to the traditional models that
look for the utility-maximizing allocation from the viewpoint of the citizens. Clearly, other
equilibria will feature more ineﬃciency than the best SPE. From the strict concavity of
individuals’ problem, it is clear that the best SPE will be symmetric and we use this fact
throughout to economize on notation. In parti c u l a r ,w er e f e rt oaS P Eb yt h ea l o n g - t h e -
equilibrium path actions, that is, as {       +1 +1}
∞
=0.
The ﬁrst step in our analysis is to establish a connection between the SPE of the game
described here and competitive equilibria (given policies). In particular, recall that even
though there is a dynamic political game between the government and the citizens, each
individual makes his economic decisions competitively, that is, taking prices as given.
Deﬁnition 1 For a given sequence of policies {   +1}
∞
=0,acompetitive
equilibrium is a sequence of allocations
n
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ +1
o∞
=0






ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ +1
o∞
=0
maximizes (1) subject to (5) given
{   +1}
∞
=0 and {ˆ  ˆ }
∞
=0.
ii (factor prices) factor prices ˆ  and ˆ  are given by (2) evaluated at  = ˆ  and
 = ˆ  at each .
iii (government budget constraint) the government budget constraint (4) is satisﬁed
at each .
7For a standard treatment of the SPE in a game between a government and a continuum of citizens,
see Chari and Kehoe (1990).
9iv (feasibility) the feasibility constraint
ˆ  +ˆ  +  + ˆ +1 ≤ (ˆ ˆ ) (6)
is satisﬁed at each .
Given the diﬀerentiability and the Inada-type assumptions imposed above, utility
maximization requirement of a competitive equilibrium implies that, as long as  =1 ,
the following two ﬁrst-order conditions must hold
(1 − )ˆ 
0(ˆ )=
0(ˆ ) and (1 − )ˆ 
0(ˆ )=
0(ˆ −1) (7)
These are written for aggregates, suppressing the subscript , for notational convenience.
The ﬁrst condition requires the marginal utility from an additional unit of labor supply to
be equal to the marginal disutility of labor, and the second is the standard Euler equation
for the marginal utility of consumption between two periods. In addition, no arbitrage
implies that whenever there is no default ∗
 =1 , the value of holding capital and bonds
must be the same, thus
(1 − )ˆ  = 
−1
  (8)
If this condition did not hold, individuals would either not invest in physical capital or not
hold any government bonds (since one of the two assets would have a higher certain rate
of return than the other). Given the concavity of the utility-maximization problem of the
citizens, (5), (7) and (8) are not only necessary but also suﬃcient. In view of this, we can
ﬁrst state the following preliminary result connecting the SPE in which the government
does not default and provides the public good to a corresponding competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider any SPE {      +1 +1}
∞
=0 with  =  =
1 for all . Then there exists a sequence { }
∞
=0 such that {   +1}
∞
=0,w i t h
associated prices { }
∞






Proof. This result follows from the deﬁnition of the competitive equilibrium, Deﬁn-
ition 1, the conditions on factor prices (2), the ﬁrst order conditions on capital and
labor (7), and the no-arbitrage condition (8). First, the SPE must satisfy the fea-
sibility condition, (6), by construction, thus the feasibility condition (iv) of Deﬁni-
tion 1, and it also satisﬁe st h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t( 4 )( w i t ho rw i t h o u tﬁ-
nancing of government expenditures, {}
∞
=0, since this is already speciﬁed by the se-
quence {       +1 +1}
∞
=0), so the government budget constraint







=0 must satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions on capital and labor (7)
and {+1}
∞
=0 must satisfy the no-arbitrage condition (8), since if this were not the case,
there would exist some equilibrium-path history , where an individual can deviate and
improve his utility. Since (7) and (8) are necessary and suﬃcient for utility-maximization,
the utility maximization condition in the competitive equilibrium (i) of Deﬁnition 1 is also
satisﬁed, completing the proof.
To make further progress, we use the standard technique in dynamic ﬁscal policy
analysis of representing a competitive equilibrium subject to taxes by introducing an
implementability constraint (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, Chari and Kehoe, 1998,
or Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004). This primal approach has the advantage of turning
the government (politician) maximization problem into one of choosing allocations rather
than taxes.
Proposition 2 Take the initial capital tax rate 0 ∈ [01), the initial capital stock
0 ≥ 0, and the initial government bond holdings 0 as given. Suppose that  =  =1
for all . Then, the sequence
n
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ +1
o∞
=0
is a competitive equilibrium for some
{ }
∞




















Proof. Substitute the necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order conditions for utility maximiza-
tion given in (7) into the individual budget constraint, (5), and rearrange to achieve the
required implementability constraint (9). If this condition were not satisﬁed, it would
imply that either at some , utility-maximization fails or the individual budget constraint
is not satisﬁed.
Given Proposition 2, the traditional analysis of optimal ﬁscal policy proceeds to ﬁnd
a sequence of allocation and the associated taxes that maximize the utility of the citizens
while generating suﬃcient revenue to ﬁnance . In our environment with political econ-
omy constraints, there are two crucial diﬀerences. First, the best SPE must also raise
additional resources to ﬁnance government (politician) consumption, .I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
it is straightforward that if we chose  =0for all , the politician in power would be
better oﬀ taxing capital and labor at a very high rate and consuming the proceeds today
and then being replaced. Second, and related to the previous point, we must make sure
that the politician in power never ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to deviate from the implicitly-chosen
11sequence of allocations. This will be done by introducing another sequence of constraints,
the political sustainability constraints. The previous argument already suggests what form
these sustainability constraints should take. At any point in time, the politician in power
can always deviate to  =  =1 , collect all production as tax revenue, and consume
all the proceeds. The worst subgame perfect punishment that the citizens can impose
is to replace the politician. After replacement, we assume that the politician receives
zero consumption and obtains per period utility (0) = 0 in all future dates.8 By the
standard arguments in dynamic and repeated games (e.g., Abreu, 1988), it is suﬃcient to
look at this worst punishment to characterize the best SPE. This best deviation for the
politician combined with the worst punishment on the side of the citizens implies that




(+) ≥ (( )) (10)
We next show that (10) is in fact the relevant sustainability constraint. In particular,
the next proposition proves that if the best allocation subject to (10) involves the provi-
sion of the public good in all periods, then the best SPE will involve no replacement of
the initial politician and no default, and can be characterized as a solution to a simple
maximization problem with (10) as the sustainability constraint.
Proposition 3 Suppose that given the sequence {}
∞
=0, any solution to the maximization
of (1), subject to the feasibility constraint, (6), the implementability constraint (9), and the
















also involves no replacement of the




 =1for all ) along the equilibrium path. This best SPE can be char-
acterized as maximizing the utility of the citizens (1), subject to the feasibility constraint,
(6), the implementability constraint (9), and the political sustainability constraint (10).
Proof. First, note that by the argument preceding the sustainability constraint (10),
this equation is a necessary condition, since otherwise the politician can improve his
utility by deviating. Moreover, the feasibility constraint (6) is necessary by Deﬁnition 1
and implementability constraint (9) is necessary by Proposition 2. Therefore, the best
8The alternative would be to allow the politician to save and achieve consumption smoothing after
the replacement. Whether or not we allow the politician to save after replacement has no eﬀect on our
results.
12SPE cannot give higher utility to citizens than the maximization of the citizen’s utility
(1), subject to feasibility (6), implementability (9), and sustainability (10). This can be
achieved with no replacement of the politician, with no default and with the required
public good provision at all dates.
We next prove that actions ∗
 =0 , ∗
 = ∗
 =1for all  are necessarily part of the
best SPE. To do this, let us ﬁrst suppose that there exists a best SPE that implements















=0. We will then show that ∗
 =0 , ∗
 = ∗
 =1 ,
so the best SPE involves no political replacement, no default, and involves public good
provision along the equilibrium path.
Now, to obtain a contradiction, suppose that the best SPE involves politician replace-
ment along the equilibrium path. Then, the initial politician must be replaced after some
equilibrium-path history ˆ  (even though he has not deviated). At time  this politician
is in power and pursues a policy that maximizes (1), subject to (6), (9), and (10). This
implies that at , ∗
 = ∗
 =1and the politician’s sustainability constraint, (10), holds.
Hence, the utility of the politician at time  must be at least ( (∗
 ∗
)).I np a r t i c u l a r ,






















is the continuation utility of this politician, but since there is replacement in





=0 . After replacement, the next politician must
























so that the sustainability constraint (10) for this new politician is satisﬁed. Now consider
the following variation: do not replace the initial politician at ˆ  and provide him with
exactly the same continuation allocation as the new politician. By construction (and by
the fact that all politicians are identical), this variation satisﬁes (10) after ˆ .N o w ,t h e



























=0 . But this implies that with this variation, the sustainability constraint,
13(10), for the initial politician at time  holds as strict inequality, thus ∗
 can be reduced
and ∗
















not have been a solution to the problem of maximizing (1), subject to (6), (9), and (10),
yielding a contradiction and establishing the claim that the best SPE must involve ∗
 =0
for all .
To see that the best SPE involves no default, suppose that ∗
 =0and ∗
  0 (if
∗
 ≤ 0,  =0is not allowed). Then, there exists no price  at which individuals would
buy bonds in the previous period −1, thus the allocation must have zero bonds, ∗
 =0 ,
which implies that ∗
 =1 . This contradiction establishes that ∗
 =1for all .T h a t
the best SPE involves public good provision at all dates is also straightforward by the
hypothesis of the proposition (that any solution to maximizing (1), subject to (6), (9),
and (10) involves  =1 ).
To complete the proof, we only need to show that the maximization of (1), subject
to (6), (9), and (10) is a SPE. This follows straightforwardly from Proposition 1 and the
fact that replacing a politician that has deviated from the implicitly-agreed tax sequence
is a best response for the citizens given the history  up to that point. To see this,
consider the following strategy proﬁle; after a deviation the politician will always play
0
 = 0
 =1for all . This is a best response for the politician anticipating replacement
at each date after deviation, and given this strategy by politicians, replacement after
deviation is indeed a best response for the citizens.
We now can state and prove our main result, which characterizes the time path of
taxes corresponding to the best SPE.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the maximization of (1), subject to the feasibility constraint,
(6), the implementability constraint (9), and the political sustainability constraint (10)
involves  =1for all ,t h a t{}
∞
























=0 converges to a steady state
¡
  ¢
. Then we have that:
1. if the politicians are as patient as, or relatively more patient than, the citizens, i.e.,
if  ≥ , then the sustainability constraint (10) becomes slack as  →∞ ,a n dw e
have that lim→∞ ∗
 =0 ;
2. if the politicians are relatively less patient than the citizens, i.e., if  ,t h e nt h e
sustainability constraint (10) binds as  →∞ ,a n dlim→∞ ∗
  0.









solution to maximization of (1) subject to (6), (9) and (10). Write the Lagrangian for
this problem and let 
 ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint (6),
 on the implementability constraint (9) and  ≥ 0 on the participation constraint (10).
Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian implies that the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions with

































































Note that by deﬁnition, the multiplier on the implementability constraint, ,m u s tb e
ﬁnite. From (12) it follows that there exists lim→∞  = 
  ∞,b e c a u s elim→∞∗

is assumed to exist, and Inada conditions ensure that it is ﬁnite since the steady-state
output is ﬁnite, and (·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
(Part 1) First, suppose that the discount factors of the politician and the citizens are









Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that 
− does not converge to zero. We know
that ∗
 →  from the feasibility constraint (6), which in a best SPE must be satis-








=0 converges to some steady
state
¡
   ¢
and {}
∞




− →∞ . Then it must be the case that 0() →∞ . Since we proved
that lim→∞ = 
  ∞,t h i si so n l yp o s s i b l ei f → 0. T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h es u s -
tainability constrain (10) is violated for suﬃciently large , unless  (∗
 ∗




=0 ). But the latter would imply that  goes to 0 in ﬁnite time (since   0).
By hypothesis, the maximization of (1) subject to (6), (9) and (10) yields a solution with
  0 for all . Consequently, the above-described allocation cannot be a best SPE,
yielding a contradiction. We therefore conclude that 
− → 0.T h u s ,a s →∞ ,( 1 0 )
becomes asymptotically slack.
15Let us next take the limit as  →∞in (12), (13) and (14). Using the fact that







































Equations (16) and (17) imply that 
  0. To see this, recall that 
 ≥ 0, because
it is the multiplier on the resource constraint. To obtain a contradiction to the claim
that 
  0,s u p p o s et h a t
 =0 . Then, since 0  0 and 00  0,( 1 7 )i m p l i e st h a t
 ∈ (−10). However, since 0  0 and 00  0,( 1 6 )c a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed with  ∈ (−10)
and 
 =0 . This yields a contradiction and establishing that 










Then, (7) combined with (19) implies that lim→∞ ∗
 =0 , completing the proof of Part
1w h e n = .







−,t h es a m e
argument as above establishes that 
− → 0 and therefore (19) must hold and thus
lim→∞ ∗
 exists and is equal to 0. This completes the proof of Part 1.
(Part 2). Now consider the case where  . By the hypothesis that a steady state
exists, (12) implies that  → 
. First, to obtain a contradiction, suppose that 
 =0 .
From (15), we have



























Since  ≥ 0 for all , 
 =0implies that each term in the summation in the second
l i n em u s tg ot oz e r oa s →∞ . Therefore, 
− → 0. Then, as  →∞ ,( 1 6 )a n d
(17) again hold with 
 =0 , and the same argument as in Part 1 yield a contradiction
and establishes that 
  0. By the hypothesis that a steady state exists, we also have
0() → 0()  0 (since 0 ()  0 for all ). Combining these two observations with









 = Ψ  0).
16Next, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that 
− → 0. This means that for any
0 there exists ∞ such that for all  ≥ ,w eh a v e

















































where the ﬁrst inequality exploits the fact that 
− for all and the sec-
ond line uses the fact that the sum in square brackets is less than 1(1 − ).N e x t ,
observe that for  suﬃciently large, the expression in the curly brackets is arbitrarily




  2(1 − ).S i n c e









 = Ψ  0. T h i se s t a b l i s h e st h a t
− does not
converge to 0. Then, combining (12), (14) and (19) implies that lim→∞ ∗
 also exists
and lim→∞ ∗
  0, completing the proof of Part 2.
This proposition is the main result of our paper. The intuition for this result is that,
when  =  or when  , the political sustainability constraints are present, but
the best SPE involves backloading of the payments to politicians.9 This backloading
(deﬁned in the right sense) ensures that the sustainability constraint of the politician will
eventually become slack. As this happens, distortions, and in particular distortions in
saving decisions, disappear, and the corresponding competitive equilibrium converges to
zero capital taxes. Therefore, the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sp r o p o s i t i o ns h o w st h a tt h eC h a m l e y -
Judd results on zero capital taxes generalize to political economy environments where
politicians are suﬃciently patient.
The second part of the proposition, on the other hand, shows how positive capital
taxes can arise as part of the best SPE when politicians are more impatient than the
citizens, that is, when  . As a result, the sustainability constraint, (10), remains
binding asymptotically. A binding sustainability constraint implies that higher output
must be associated with greater rents to politicians. This raises the opportunity cost of
9See Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a) for further discussion of backloading in political econ-
omy environments and Ray (2002) for a general treatment of backloading results in principal-agent
models.
17increasing output for the citizens. In particular, reducing the capital stock away from
the “ﬁrst-best” level weakens the deviation temptations of the politician and reduces
the rents that needs to be paid in order to ensure sustainability. Consequently, the
best SPE involves lower savings than the ﬁrst-best (the undistorted neoclassical growth
model). It is also important to note that these lower saving levels are decentralized by
positive long-run capital taxes. This follows from (7); if the economy had  =0 ,e a c h
individual would choose the undistorted level of savings, leading either to the violation
of the sustainability constraint or to higher rents for politicians. Thus positive capital
taxes are necessary to ensure the appropriate level of capital accumulation and emerge as
a tool useful in maximizing the ex ante utility of the citizens in the presence of political
economy distortions.
T h er e s u l ti nt h eﬁrst part of Proposition 4 is surprising. It suggests that the conclu-
sions of the existing literature that the capital tax is zero may have a wider applicability
than the framework with a benevolent government typically considered in the literature
and applies, as in our paper, to a class of circumstances in which the government is
controlled by self-interested politicians without the ability to commit to future taxes.
Nevertheless, the second part of the proposition might ultimately be the more important
result, since politicians being more impatient (short-sighted) than the citizens is arguably
a better approximation of reality, particularly if there are exogenous reasons for which
politicians lose power (even if they do not deviate from the prescribed sequence of ac-
tions). In this light, Proposition 4 suggests that considerable caution is necessary in using
the normative benchmark of zero capital taxes emerging from models that ignore political
economy constraints.
3 Quantitative Investigation
In this section, we provide an illustrative quantitative investigation of the theoretical
results presented in the previous sections. Our purpose is not to undertake a quantitatively
plausible calibration, but to give further intuition for the theoretical results derived in the
previous section, and also provides some simple insights about convergence to the steady
s t a t ea n dt h es t r u c t u r eo ft a x e sb e f o r es u c hc o n v e r g e n c et a k e sp l a c e .
We choose standard functional forms. In particular, the instantaneous utility of con-












where  =1 .T h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ro ft h ec i t i z e n si st a k e na s =0 95.





w h e r ew en o r m a l i z e =1 , and set  =1 3 to be consistent with a capital share of
approximately 1/3 in national income. We set the initial amount of capital to 0 =0 1.
The instantaneous utility function of politicians is given by
()=

where  =0 75. This implies that politicians has a larger intertemporal elasticity of
substitution than the citizens. We adopt this speciﬁcation, since, otherwise, deviations
are not suﬃciently attractive for politicians (without introducing the ability to save and
borrow for the politicians).
We consider two values for the discount factor of the politician  =0 95 and  =0 9.
Government expenditure is set equal to  =0 1 in each period. Figure 3 shows the results
of this numerical example. It depicts the path of capital taxes in the best SPEs for the two
diﬀerent values of  and the path of capital taxes in the corresponding Ramsey economy
(without political economy constraints).10 In the Ramsey economy, the optimal tax is
positive in the ﬁrst period and then is equal to zero.
The two solid lines in Figure 3 depict the best SPE corresponding to  =0 95 and to
 =0 9.I nt h eﬁrst case, the tax on capital converges to zero as predicted by Proposition
4. However, the convergence is slower than in the corresponding Ramsey economy, where
there is only one period of positive taxation. In fact, in the best SPE, capital taxes are
at ﬁr s ta sh i g ha s2 0 %c o m p a r e dt ot a x e sl e s st h a n1 0 %i nt h eR a m s e ye c o n o m y .
When  =0 9, so that the politician is more impatient than the citizens, capital taxes
again start relatively high and decline over time, but do not converge to zero. In this case,
the limiting value of capital taxes is about 3.5%. This computation therefore shows that
10To make the Ramsey economy comparable to the setup with political sustainability constraints, we
take the amount of government expenditure to be  +  at time , where the sequence {} is the one
generated by the best SPE for the same parameter values. This is the reason why Ramsey equilibria are
diﬀerent depending on the value of .








































Figure 3: The best SPE and Ramsey equilibria for diﬀerent values of .
20a relatively small diﬀerence between the discount factors of politicians and citizens leads
to positive long-run capital taxes, which is again consistent with the patterns implied by
Proposition 4. It is also useful to note that a lower discount factor for the politician does
not necessarily imply that capital taxes will be uniformly higher. The ﬁgure shows that
with  =0 95, capital taxes start out higher than in the economy with  =0 9,a n do n l y
fall below those in the  =0 9 economy in later periods.
4C o n c l u s i o n
T h em a i nr e s u l to ft h eR a m s e yp a r a d i gm of dynamic optimal taxation, ﬁrst arrived by
Chamley (1985) and Judd (1985) is that long-run capital taxes should be equal to zero. In
practice, most societies have positive taxes on capital income. One perspective, implicitly
adopted for example by Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), is that this is a “bad idea”–a
result of bad policy design or incorrect understanding of economic theories.
In this paper, we took an alternative perspective and attempted to understand whether
positive taxes on capital income may result from political economy considerations, that
is, not as a bad idea, but as a necessary cost to be borne because the government is not
perfect agent of the citizens.
Formally, we studied the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the neoclassical
growth model under the assumption that taxes are controlled by self-interested politicians
who cannot commit. Politicians, in turn, can be removed from power by citizens via
elections. As in the standard (Ramsey) dynamic taxation models, our environment only
allows linear taxes on capital and labor income. The celebrated Chamley-Judd result
shows that, with benevolent governments with full commitment power, long-run capital
taxes should be equal to zero. Since this result relies on the existence of a benevolent
government that is able to commit to a complete sequence of (future) tax policies, one
may conjecture that the presence of self-interested politicians unable to commit to future
taxes will lead to positive long-run capital taxes.
We showed that the long-run capital tax is indeed positive when politicians are more
impatient than the citizens. In this case, the marginal cost of additional savings for the
citizens is higher in equilibrium than in the undistorted allocation, because a greater level
of the capital stock of the economy will increase the politician’s temptation to deviate
and thus necessitates greater rents to the politician to satisfy the political sustainability
constraint. However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, when politicians are as patient as, or
21more patient than, the citizens, we established that the political sustainability constraint
eventually becomes slack and long-run capital taxes converge to zero. Our analysis, there-
fore, shows that the standard dynamic ﬁscal policy results may have wider applicability
than previously recognized. Perhaps more importantly, they also suggest considerable
caution in using these results in more realistic environments without a benevolent, all-
powerful social planner. If, as many studies of political economy suggest, politicians are
more short-sighted than citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium involves positive
taxes on capital, even in the long run.
Several research directions for future research are highlighted by our results in the cur-
rent paper. First, we characterized the structure of “best equilibria”–from the viewpoint
of the citizens. An interesting question is whether such equilibria will arise in practice
and what types of institutions make their emergence more likely. For example, one may
study whether certain speciﬁc types of institutions lead to (support) such equilibria, while
others make allocations that are within the constrained Pareto frontier more likely. Sec-
ond, we focused on the speciﬁc type of political economy considerations, resulting from
self-interested rulers. In practice, in addition to the self-interest of politicians and par-
ties, there are also issues related to conﬂict between diﬀerent groups of citizens, and the
two sets of issues interact in a rich manner. How these richer political economy interac-
tions aﬀect the structure of optimal dynamic taxation in general, and capital taxation in
particular, is another interesting area for future research.
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